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The United States' Pursuit of Regime Change in Venezuela
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Abstract
Since its first mass protest in 2016, Venezuela has been in a state of
crisis, facing public protest, inflation rates, and diminishing access to basic
necessities. Many of these issues can be tied to the decline of Venezuela’s
once successful oil industry, which had created an economic-bubble until
recent years. This paper uncovers the historical context of the issues faced by
Venezuela’s oil industry and analyzes the role the United States has played in
promoting its own influence within it. Furthermore, this paper examines the
specific methods the United States has used to assert this influence and the
motives and incentives it has in doing so.

Introduction
On March 2, 2018, The Washington Post published an describing
the Venezuelan diaspora into neighboring Latin American countries and
throughout the Western Hemisphere.1 Since political protests began in
early 2016, Venezuelans have experienced food shortages, medical supply
shortages, and a sharp increase in violence.2 Additionally, the world has
heard read news stories about prison inmates foraging rats for food, zoo
animals starving, and mothers crossing national borders to secure medicine
for their children.3 The world has also seen emotional selfie-styled videos of
rebel fighters facing their last hours as they stand off against the Venezuelan
military.4 In response, roughly 600,000 Venezuelans have fled to Colombia,
1 Ishaan Tharoor, “Venezuela’s Maduro hollows out his nation,” The Washington Post
(March 1, 2018).
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Nicholas Casey, “Venezuela’s Most-Wanted Rebel Shared His Story, Just Before
Death,” The New York Times (January 21, 2018).
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40,000 to Trinidad and Tobago, 30,000 to Brazil, 20,000 to Aruba, and 5,000
to the Caribbean isle of Curacao since August of 2017.5 The Colombian
border also continues to see up to 3,000 new migrants per day.6
The humanitarian crisis that faces Venezuela is the result of an intense
ongoing political crisis. In the United States, media has painted the crisis as
a one-sided affair – and President Nicolas Maduro as the malicious dictator
-- while the United States fights to promote and support democracy in the
country. Since the early 2000s, the United States has funded opposition
forces in Venezuela, hoping to secure a political outcome that would create
favorable business conditions in Venezuela. It addition to this, they have
supported uprisings and protests, and have sanctioned Venezuela, hoping to
revolutionize its political order. While establishment forces may argue that
the United States is doing so only in support of developing a democracy, its
involvement has contributed to political instability and to the development of
a humanitarian crisis.
The events in Venezuela are relevant to the international community
and to the discussion surrounding international law due to the role that other
states have played in Venezuela’s political upheaval. Venezuela, controlling a
large supply of oil, is significant to the world’s most powerful states who rely
on imports of this resource to support their own infrastructures. The United
States has enjoyed a long relationship with Venezuela based their historical
dependence on the country as a reliable oil supplier. As a different political
order begins to emerge in Venezuela -- one which threatens the capitalist
economic system established by the West -- the United States has begun
pursuing regime change, hoping to disrupt this process. Questioning the role
that the United States plays in Venezuela has led me to the following research
question: How has the United States pushed for regime change in Venezuela,
and for what reasons has it done so?

Conventional Wisdom
Both American and Latin American publics are skeptical of the United
States’ role in supporting democracy abroad. A 2013 poll conducted by
CBS News / New York Times Poll indicated that almost 3 in 4 Americans
believe America should not intervene in foreign dictatorships to install
democracy.7 Another 2013 poll conducted by NBC News / Wall Street
5 Op. cit., fn. 1.
6 Op. cit., fn. 1.
7 “America’s Role in World Affairs,” CBS News / New York Times Poll (September 6-8, 2013).
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Journal Poll indicated that only 22% of Americans believe America should
continue promoting democracy abroad.8 Other polls which have studied the
opinions of Latin American publics have found a similar disapproval for the
United States’ promotion of democracy abroad. A poll conducted by BBC
World Survey indicated that while a majority of Latin Americans support
democracy in their country, a large portion of them share a distrust for the
role of U.S. actions in supporting such democracies.9
This conventional wisdom is misleading, however, as it fails to address
ulterior motives for the United States’ role in pursuing regime change.
Current conventional wisdom views the United States’ purpose as one of
pure intentions to support fledgling democracies, but my analysis will create
a more accurate picture of the United States’ pursuits of regime change. I
will analyze how the United States might stand to benefit from influencing
Venezuelan politics, in addition to the methods they have used for doing so.
This research paper will make the conventional wisdom more complete by
framing regime change using the theoretical paradigm of realism to construct
a more accurate portrayal of the United States’ relationship with Venezuela.

Methodology and Evidence
I employ qualitative methodology to examine the theoretical paradigm
of realism as it applies to my research and use three case studies to answer
my research question. The first case study examines the culture surrounding
oil in Venezuela, addressing how political leadership influences the
Venezuelan oil market and who is able to invest in it. The second case
study examines the U.S.’s pursuits of regime change under President Hugo
Chavez and how Chavez’s presidency threatened the U.S’s access to oil.
Lastly, my third case study examines the U.S.’s pursuits of regime change
under President Nicolas Maduro and how Maduro’s changing policies have
further threatened the U.S., giving an advantage to its global competitors. I
use primary evidence to research my case studies and secondary evidence
to enrich my understanding of the context surrounding these sources.
Examples of primary sources include U.S. State Department documents,
C.I.A documents, presidential executive orders, congressional bills, fiscal
reports by the N.E.D, U.S. energy statistics, and C.R.S reports. Examples of
8 “America’s Role in World Affairs,” NBC News / Wall Street Journal Poll (September
5-8, 2013).
9 “Latin American Publics are Skeptical About U.S. - But Not About Democracy,”
World Public Opinion (March 7, 2007).
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secondary sources used includes news articles, publications from non-profit
organizations like the NACLA, publications from universities like Columbia
- SIPA, and scholarly articles from journals like Foreign Affairs.

Theoretical Paradigm
At first glance, it is understandable why the conventional view is that
the United States’ motives in Venezuela are aimed at promoting democracy
rather than Venezuelan regime change. However, by using realism to analyze
research, one can form a more complete understanding of the United States’
ulterior motives. There are two core assumptions of realism that direct my
research. The first of these is that, in the international system, there exists no
higher actor than the state.10 This means that states are the highest actors, and
that states are most loyal to themselves even if they appear to have strong
alliances with other states. The second core assumption of realism is that
the behavior of a state can best be understood by the relative power it stands
to gain from its actions.11 This means that states behave in order to increase
their power in a global competition against others.
Realism best frames and explains the answer to my research question
because by pursuing regime change in Venezuela, the United States is
seeking to increase its own power. Realism allows us to see past the facade
of ‘democratic development’ that U.S regime change takes on and is useful
in understanding why such pursuits take place and the means through which
they are executed. In understanding that states often behave in ways that will
increase their own power, realism gives us the ability to detect disguised,
realist grasps of power that permeate the international system for what they
are.

Research Findings
To explain the United States’ true motives in pursuing regime change in
Venezuela, one must first have an understanding of the culture surrounding
oil in Venezuela. Venezuela is a region that is incredibly rich in oil.
Indigenous tribes are said to have used naturally flowing oil and asphalt
for medicinal purposes centuries ago.12 It was not until 1912, however, that
Venezuela first began drilling for this oil, triggering many foreign companies
10 Sean D. Murphy, Principles of International Law (St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West,
2012).
11 Ibid.
12 Erik Bakke, “US-Venezuelan Relations,” Harvard Model Congress (2014).
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to begin investing in the country.13 The early 20th-century oil boom would
completely rearrange Venezuelan society, as oil became the center of
Venezuelan industrialization. Agricultural production became an afterthought
almost overnight as it was overwhelmed by profits from the oil industry.14
The old elites of Venezuela who had become powerful through such
agriculture lost their grip on politics, and the Democratic Action party rose to
power, replacing Venezuela’s old economic order with one centered around
oil.15 This party was a populist party, and employed promises of land reform,
democratization, and welfare expansion to create a supporter base among the
lower and middle classes.16
The Democratic Action coalition became the dominant force in politics
in 1958, focusing Venezuelan policies around the industrialization of oil
for the following decades. It did so in an obsessive way, spending large
proportions of its money developing oil infrastructures, while ignoring other
parts of the economy.17 While this created an economic boom in Venezuela,
the boom was concentrated in urban upper class involved with oil business.18
The rural poor, along with the majority of Venezuela’s population, had little
access to these new-found riches and had to face weakened infrastructures as
oil drained funds from other sectors. This centralization of wealth also made
the Democratic Action party very powerful, turning Venezuela into a oneparty government.19 While enriching Venezuela, the country’s economy and
currency became dependent on oil, making it vulnerable to a volatile global
market. Through its development of oil infrastructures, the Democratic
Action party allowed Venezuela to become one of the world’s largest oil
producers, but did so in an unsustainable way, angering a large class of
people who had not been able to access the economic benefits of Venezuela’s
oil boom.
The face of this populist movement was Hugo Chavez, elected in
1998 on promises to destroy Venezuela’s system of oil centralization and

13 Ibid.
14 Gregory Wilpert, “The Economics, Culture, and Politics of Oil in Venezuela,”
Venezuelanalysis.com, August 30, 2013, , accessed March 23, 2018, https://
venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/74.
15 Op. cit., fn. 11.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Op. cit., fn. 11.
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replace it with one that would fund social projects.20 Chavez wanted to
target Venezuela’s policy of “Oil Opening” which had dominated oil policy
since the early 1990s.21 Under this policy, transnational oil companies had
been invited to invest in the industry in hopes that this would cheapen the
development of oil infrastructures.22 “Oil Opening” diluted ownership of oil
in Venezuela and made foreign interests powerful in influencing Venezuelan
policy. It had also diverted oil profits away from the people and into foreign
bank accounts. Because Chavez’s reforms threatened a powerful, entrenched
system, and because he had no political allies, he faced barriers for policy
reforms. This prompted him to create a new constitution in 1999, giving
the presidency stronger powers.23 He used his presidential powers to pass
three major reforms to Venezuela’s oil industry meant to give the presidency
more power over its ownership. Chavez strengthened Venezuela’s role in the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (or “OPEC”) and targeted
the enforcement of production quotas for all of its members.24 He did this to
increase the global price of oil barrels, which had reached a low of $8.43 per
barrel when he took office.25
Chavez also passed reforms to the Energy Ministry, giving it stronger
powers as an agency of the executive branch.26 Petróleos de Venezuela,
S.A. (PDVSA), Venezuela’s state oil company, had directors with strong
business and political affiliations that allowed them to establish a degree of
independence in dealing with its structure and the transnational investments
it received.27 Reforms to the Energy Ministry were meant to disable PDVSA
from continuing this path of independence and to reinstall control over the
company. In seeking to obtain higher governmental profits, Chavez also
replaced Venezuelan oil taxation with a system of royalties.28 The tax system
surrounding the oil industry had grown too complex and the government had

20 Luis Lander and Margarita Lopez-Maya, “Venezuela’s Oil Reform and Chavismo,”
NACLA, September 25, 2007, , accessed March 23, 2018, https://nacla.org/article/
venezuelas-oil-reform-and-chavismo.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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begun to see weakening revenues based on its taxation of oil.29 The collection
of royalties was meant to be a more direct system of revenue collection that
could end this problem.30 Taken together, these reforms were meant to end
the privatization of Venezuela’s oil and push the country in the direction
of oil nationalization so that Venezuela could utilize this wealth for social
policies. While the reforms Chavez made created many benefits for his
society, the way in which Chavez secured them would become a source of
agitation for countries like the United States, who had profited off reliable
access to Venezuelan oil.
When Hugo Chavez died in 2013, he was replaced by Nicolas Maduro
to continue his legacy of the political ideology, Chavismo. Under Maduro,
the mismanagement of PDVSA funds that began under Chavez continued,
and this caused a crisis in the Venezuela’s oil market. Under Chavismo,
PDVSA began losing many of its profits to the funding of social programs.
Because it was spending a majority of its funds on such programs, it was
unable to invest in its own infrastructure.31 This led to a degradation of
oil technologies in Venezuela which has caused the country to lose its
competitive advantage against other exporters in OPEC. Now, Venezuela can
only drill low-quality oil and must mix it with the higher quality oil from
companies like B.P., to make its oil commercializable.32 This process has
made Venezuela’s industry especially uncompetitive-- when the government
lacks the funds to pay for the importation of high quality oil to mix with
its own, its oil industry is brought to a standstill as its oil is unable to be
brought to the global market. Chavismo has also created a law which restricts
the price of oil in Venezuela to stay under one cent per liter.33 This policy
was effective when Venezuela was still one of the world’s largest suppliers
of oil, but now that it is reaching its historically low levels of production,
the policy forces PDVSA to run oil fields at a loss and thus contributes to
a critical loss of funds.34 PDVSA’s massive debts have forced it to look
towards international investors to help keep it running.35 Maduro has created
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Lisa Viscidi, “Venezuela on the Brink: How the State Wrecked the Oil Sector--and
How to save It,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 5 (September/October 2016).
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Antoine Halff et al., “Apocalypse Now: Venezuela, Oil, and Reconstruction,”
Columbia - SIPA (accessed March 23, 2018).
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a cryptocurrency based around the value of a single crude barrel and has
allowed China and Russia to invest billions in the company.36 These policies
allow foreign interests to gain influence in Venezuela’s oil market, creating
a strong source of friction for the United States who is being excluded from
this opportunity.
The political crisis currently facing Venezuela is a direct result of the
mismanagement of PDVSA by Chavismo. Venezuela has built an empire
around its oil, basing its currency around the production of oil, and basing
the success of its economy on the competitive advantage it has against other
OPEC exporters. Despite this, mismanagement has allowed the company
to lose access to funds that would go towards investment, resulting in a
company which is incredibly indebted and yet must work within its unableto-upgrade infrastructures to repay Venezuela’s large debt. This process has
halted the once supreme production of oil in Venezuela and has severely
damaged the value of its currency. This has created a humanitarian crisis for
Venezuelans and has prompted the United States to seek out regime change
in the country.
When Hugo Chavez became President of Venezuela in 1999, the United
States was immediately threatened. Chavez had grown famous in Latin
America for his anti-American viewpoints, variously referring to thenPresident George W. Bush as a donkey, Mr. Danger, and the devil.37 One of
Chavez’s sources for his anger towards the United States was his distaste of
American companies’ access to Venezuelan oil. When Chavez talked about
removing foreign interests from Venezuela’s oil industry, he was referring
to foreign companies, many of which were American. This presented a
clear threat to the United States’ steady supply of Venezuelan oil, which
accounted for a large portion of its imports.38 Hugo Chavez threatened the
United States’ access to a resource it was becoming dependent upon, causing
it to pursue regime change in order to install a leader that would continue a
tradition of favorable economic conditions towards the U.S.
The United States attempted this coup primarily through the support
of opposition political parties and the preparation of opposition military
leaders. An unclassified State Department document entitled A Review of
36 Lesley Wroughton and Girish Gupta, “U.S. warns investors over Venezuela’s
‘petro’ cryptocurrency,” Reuters (January 16, 2018).
37 “Hugo Chavez: Memorable moments,” BBC News (March 6, 2013).
38 “U.S. Imports from Venezuela of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products,” U.S. Energy
Information Administration (accessed March, 23, 2018).
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U.S. Policy Toward Venezuela November 2001 - April 2002 reveals the
ways in which these actions took place. The document reveals the nongovernmental organization, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED),
and its funding of opposition political parties that supported an overthrow of
the Chavez regime.39 While the NED is an NGO and should be unaffiliated
with government, it receives all of its funding from Congress, has to report
to Congress, and so should be considered an acting arm of Congress.40
The NED’s program spent over two million dollars in six months, funding
political programs that were meant to politicize an uneducated citizen base
and activate it against Chavez.41 The NED also coordinated communications
between members of Congress and Venezuelan opposition leaders.42
Congress members were so comfortable with the idea of pushing for regime
change that they even held dinners with media influencers to discuss the
effects of creating anti-Chavez media.43 The United States also spent close to
one million dollars brining Venezuelan military officials to the United States
to participate in military training programs and coordination of an estimated
$697 million in military consummations.44
An unclassified C.I.A. document also reveals that the United States
was aware of an upcoming coup attempt against Chavez. The document
discusses an attempt being organized by disgruntled senior officers and a
group of radical new officers who would create justification for Chavez’s
replacement by provoking military action in upcoming demonstrations.45
The coup took place only five days after this report was published, installing
Pedro Carmona, a prominent businessman, as Venezuela’s new President.
Despite the undemocratic ousting of Venezuela’s President by the military,
the United States quickly recognized Carmona’s government and praised his
actions. One of Carmona’s first official meetings as President was also held
with the United States ambassador to Venezuela, in which they discussed
normalization of democracy in Venezuela.46 Carmona’s only actions as
39 “A Review of U.S. Policy Towards Venezuela November 2001 - April 2001,” U.S.
Department of State, July 2002.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 “Codel Ballenger 4/27 Dinner with Media Owners,” U.S. Department of State, May
2002.
44 Et al, 29.
45 “Senior Executive Intelligence Brief,” National Archives, April 6, 2002.
46 “Venezuela: Ambassador Shapiro Meeting With Carmona,” U.S Department of State, April 16, 2002.
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President were to dissolve Venezuela’s National Assembly and Supreme
Court, destroying any democratic institution which held a check over his
power. This caused an uproar to break out in Venezuela among civilians
and the military, creating protests which reinstalled Chavez only 48 hours
later. Chavez would respond to the coup by blaming the United States as its
organizer, further increasing tensions between the nations, resulting in the
gradual decline of oil imports to the United States from Venezuela.47
As of 2018, efforts by the United States to influence regime change
in Venezuela had not yet ceased, and new developments had prompted a
stronger reaction by the United States. In an attempt to seek out funds for
Venezuela’s struggling oil industry, Maduro has looked to outside investors
to help bolster the industry.48 Because the United States used to play the role
of supporting Venezuela’s oil industry with American investments, and no
longer does, outside countries are seeing the Venezuelan oil industry as an
opportunity to gain power that used to be held by the United States. One such
country is Russia, which has provided Venezuela’s capital of Caracas with
up to $10 billion in financial assistance geared towards the oil industry.49 Not
only do such investments give Russia influential power over the Venezuelan
oil industry, but they also disrupt American pursuits of regime change, as the
only source of funding Maduro receives is through Venezuela’s oil industry,
which has survived only due to outside investments.50 Therefore, not only
is Russia gaining power in a zero-sum game, but it is also preventing the
United States from securing its desired outcome of a President who would
promote favorable business conditions in Venezuela. Additionally, China
has played a major role in supporting Maduro, issuing $23 billion in loans to
Venezuela in a matter of years.51 China has organized many of these loans to
be paid back in the form of crude oil barrels, securing a steady source of oil
for the future.52 Venezuela seems to be turning towards the world’s Eastern
sphere of influence -- dominated by Russia and China -- for help, leaving
behind a long tradition of doing business with the United States. This has
47 Scott Wilson, “Chavez Raises Idea of U.S. Role in Coup,” The Washington Post
(May 5, 2002).
48 Op. cit., fn. 34.
49 Clifford Krauss, “Russia Uses Its Oil Giant, Rosneft, as a Foreign Policy Tool,” The
New York Times (October 29, 2017).
50 Op. cit., fn. 34.
51 Reuters Staff, “China says Venezuela can ‘appropriately’ handle debt load,” Reuters
(November 15, 2017).
52 Ibid.
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threatened the United States’ influence of power in the Western hemisphere
and has prompted the United States to continue pursuing regime change in
Venezuela.
To this end, the United States has continued its funding of the NED,
streaming money into Venezuela. Since Maduro was elected, the NED
has spent several million dollars per year undermining his presidency.53
It continues to pursue regime change by attempting to agitate a populist
civilian base and make it politically active against Maduro. Additionally,
after rising political tensions, the United States has recognized Venezuela’s
opposition leader, Juan Guaido, as the countries legitimate Interim President,
despite his failure to receive support from military leaders.54 The NED has
also funded the creation of political youth programs, media campaigns,
and has even directly funded existing political parties and the creation of
new ones.55 Furthermore, the United States government has gone public
in its denouncements of Maduro. In March of 2015, in a clear targeting
of the Maduro regime, President Obama signed Executive Order 13692.56
This executive order targeted specific individuals in office who had been
found to be in “violation of democratic principles” and had their U.S. assets
blocked, were prohibited from entering the U.S, and were no longer able to
do business with Americans.57 While this executive order did not directly
impose sanctions on Venezuela, it laid out the framework for one of the
few policy’s Obama and his successor would agree on. In August of 2017,
in response to the worsening political crisis in Venezuela, President Trump
passed Executive Order 13808, a sterner version of Obama’s 2014 order.58
Executive Order 13808 prohibited the import of Venezuelan oil and
prohibited American banks from creating any financial deals with PDVSA.59
53 Eva Golinger, “The Dirty Hand of the National Endowment for Democracy in
Venezuela,” Counterpunch.org (April 25, 2014).
54 “Recognition of Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s Interim President by Several European
Countries,” U.S. Department of State, February 4, 2019
55 “Venezuela 2017,” National Endowment for Democracy (accessed March 23,
2018).
56 Barack Obama, “Executive Order 13692 - Blocking Property and Suspending Entry
of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela,” Obama White House
archives (March 8, 2015).
57 Ibid.
58 Donald Trump, “Executive Order 13808 - Imposing Additional Sanctions with
Respect to the Situation in Venezuela,” Treasury Department (August 29, 2017).
59 Ibid.
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The purpose of this order was to cut financial support for the Maduro regime
which was dependent on the funds it received from the export of its oil. The
passing of this order triggered many laws to be proposed in Congress, also
targeting Maduro. These laws called for the release of political prisoners,
the authorization of humanitarian aid, for Venezuela to hold open elections,
and for an increased amount of congressional appropriations to be set aside
for Venezuela.60 These pursuits are meant to increase pressure on Maduro
in a way that attracts global attention, in hopes of evoking a response from
this populist base. Through both sanctions and funding, the United States
has succeeded in this effort, contributing to an intensifying political conflict
which has been called a civil war by Maduro.61 While the United States
argues that it wants to create democracy in Venezuela through these efforts,
it is undeniable that this has only complicated political development in
Venezuela and has created dishonest outcomes from illegitimate democratic
processes.

Implications of Research Findings
To understand the conclusions that can be drawn from these research
findings, one must analyze the United States’ actions through the lens of
political realism. Historically, the United States has relied on Venezuela
as a steady, reliable supplier of oil. Oil is the lifeline of civilization in the
21st century and is a necessary resource for society to function. When
populist Venezuelan movements began to push for the nationalization of this
resource and for its control to be replaced back into the hands of Venezuela,
the United States saw a threat to a source of oil it had held for a century.
While the United States argues that the efforts it pursues in Venezuela are to
support a developing democracy, it is hard to believe that the U.S would be
so involved with Venezuela’s politics if it was not so rich in oil. Furthermore,
the pursuits of its efforts since 2000, have brought little to Venezuela but a
continual intensification of political disruption. It has fueled protests and
uprisings saying it supports the people but then has acted against them,
creating sanctions that have harmed Venezuela’s economy and forced people
to migrate into neighboring countries.
Furthermore, by pursuing regime change, the United States has only
weakened itself and given an advantage to its global competitors. Venezuelan
60 Clare Seelke and Rebecca Nelson, “Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations,”
Congressional Research Service (March 9, 2018).
61 “Venezuela crisis: Maduro warns of civil war,” BBC News (February 4, 2019).
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elites have been aware of the outcome the United States seeks to pursue in
Venezuela and has been pushed to create friendships with different countries.
The United States believed that by creating a sanction on Venezuelan oil, it
would ruin Venezuela’s economy and force it into aligning its interests with
the U.S. Instead, this has only pushed Venezuela to look towards China and
Russia as new sources for its economic dependencies. China and Russia have
happily complied investing billions in the country and making a new ally in
the western hemisphere. Thus, the United States’ attempt at regime change
to create favorable politics in Venezuela has backfired, creating a Venezuelan
government that looks to the U.S’s enemies for support. Not only have U.S.
pursuits of regime change In Venezuela contributed to a humanitarian crisis,
but they have also weakened the United States against its global competitors.
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